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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Court of

Appeals

has

jurisdiction

over

this matter

pursuant to Utah Code Annotated section 78-2a-3(2)(i) (1992) as an
Appeal

from

final

Orders

denying

Plaintiff's

Petition

for

Modification of a Decree of Divorce in the Third Judicial District
Court.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Whether

the

trial

court

abused

its

discretion

by

awarding attorney fees to Appellee when Appellee failed to put
forth any evidence of the reasonableness of the amount of fees,
the necessity of the number of hours dedicated, the reasonableness
of the rate charged in light of the difficulty of the case and
result

accomplished,

community.

and

the

rates

commonly

charged

in

the

This Court will reverse a trial court only if the

appealing party can prove an abuse of discretion.

Jones v. Jones,

700 P.2d 1072, 1074 (Utah 1985).
2.

Whether the trial court's finding that Appellant and his

present wife's income is between $68,000.00 and $75,000.00 per
year is clearly erroneous when the uncontroverted evidence showed
that Appellant and his wife, driving as a team, make fourteen
cents per mile (not per driver), including per diem, and have a
total annual income of approximately $58,000.00.

This Court will

reverse a factual finding if it is shown to be clearly erroneous
under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 52(a).

1

3.

Whether the trial court

erred

in

finding

that

the

parties contemplated that Appellee would seek employment at the
time of divorce when Appellant presented evidence that Appellee
claimed that she was physically unable to obtain employment and
there was no provision in the Decree which set forth that Appellee
would increase her income.

This Court will reverse a factual

finding if it is shown to be clearly erroneous under Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure 52(a).
4.

Whether the trial court erred by not finding that a

substantial and material change of circumstances had occurred when
Appellant presented evidence of a substantial decrease in his
income to less than $30f000.00 per yearf an increase in his road
expenses,

an

increase

in

Appellee's

income,

a

decrease

in

Appellee's needs based on contributions by her two sons, and
Appellant's inability to pay the awarded amount.

The reviewing

court will reverse the trial court's findings if, when viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the findings, the evidence
is insufficient to support the findings or that the findings are
clearly erroneous.

Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84, 88 (Utah

App. 1989) (citing Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah
1985); State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)).
5.

Whether the trial court erred by including Appellant's

present wife's income in the determination that Appellant has not
had a material

and

substantial

Appellee failed to put forth any

change

in

circumstances

when

law which would

support an

inclusion of a spouse's income to determine alimony.

If a trial

2

court makes a determination of law, the legal decision is reviewed
under a correctness standard.

Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange

(II), 860 P.2d 937, 939 (Utah 1993).
6.

Whether the trial court erred in denying Appellant's

motion for new trial pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
59(a)(6) on the grounds that the evidence was insufficient to
support

the

court's

findings

and

that

the

evidence

was

insufficient to support an award of attorney fees when Appellant
presented

evidence

that

the

trial

court's

findings

of

fact

regarding Appellant's income were clearly erroneous, Appellant
presented evidence that Appellee was no longer in need of alimony,
and Appellant presented evidence and law which demonstrated that
the award of attorney fees without carrying the evidentiary burden
is clearly contrary to established Utah law.

This Court can

reverse a trial court's decision when viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the finding of the trial court, the
evidence is insufficient to support the finding.
Pro*. 52(a).

Utah R. Civ.

In considering a trial court's decision to deny a new

trial, the reviewing court will only reverse if it finds an abuse
of discretion.

Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 817 P.2d 789,

804-05 (Utah 1991).

See also, Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d

84, 90 (Utah App. 1989).

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A

Decree

of

Divorce

was

entered

on

December

31, 1989

divorcing Varnell Dobson and Dorothy Lynene Larson Dobson (Rec.
84-89)1.

Varnell Dobson filed a Petition for Modification on

October 5, 1993 (Rec. 110-15).

A hearing on Appellant's Petition

for Modification was held on October 5, 1994.

(Rec. 180-81).

The

trial court entered an Order denying Appellant's Petition for
modification of Decree of Divorce on October 20, 1994 (Rec. 18486).

The trial court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law on October 20, 1994 which stated that the parties stipulated
to the original divorcef Appellant had no material change of
circumstances because he voluntarily left his past employment and
he and his current wife have annual income of
$75,000.00

approximately

(Rec. 185). The court further found that the parties

contemplated that Lynene Larson would have to seek employment
subsequent to the divorce.

(Rec. 185).

Appellee attorney fees of $850.00

The

court

awarded

(Rec. 186).

Varnell Dobson moved for a new trial pursuant to Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, Rule 59(a) on October 28, 1994 (Rec. 187-88).
Appellant did not request oral argument

(Rec. 187-88).

Appellee

requested a decision on Appellant's Motion for New Trial without
oral argument

(Rec. 211). Appellant filed a Notice to Submit for

Decision on November 2, 1994

(Rec. 218), and a Second Request for

1

For ease of reference, citations to the Appellate Record are cited as
"Rec", citations to the Transcript of the October 5, 1994 Modification
hearing are cited as "Tr.", and citations to the Transcript of the January 30,
1995 Oral Argument are cited as "2Tr.".

4

Decision on December 6, 1994

(Rec. 221).

On December 20, 1994,

the trial court set Appellant's Motion for New Trial for oral
argument on January 30, 1995

(Rec. 223).

Appellant filed a

Supplemental Motion for New Hearing on January 16, 1995 pursuant
to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 60(b)(2)

(Rec. 225).

Appellant requested that his Rule 60(b) motion be heard at oral
argument previously scheduled for January 30, 1995

(Rec. 234-35).

After a hearing on January 30, 1995, Appellant's motion for
new trial was denied by the trial court

(Rec. 237). On March 1,

1995, the trial court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law from the hearing on Appellant's Motion for New Trial finding
that it was obvious to the court that Appellee would have to seek
employment
current

subsequent to the divorce, that Appellant and his

wife

have

annual

income

of

between

$68,000.00

and

$75,000.00, that Appellant's current wife was only present as a
driver based on Appellant's experience, that Appellant and his
wife drive an average of 4,874 miles per week, 50 weeks per year,
that Appellant's

failure

to

elicit

testimony

from Appellee's

counsel about attorney fees does not give rise to a claim for an
improper award of

fees, that Appellant's

income of at

least

$35,000.00 per year and Appellee's income of less than $10,000.00
per year does not justify a modification of the Decree, and that
the court finds Appellee's requested fees to be reasonable
309-10).
of $350.00

(Rec.

The trial court awarded Appellee further attorney fees
(Rec. 311).

5

Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal with the Third District
Court on February 6, 1995

(Rec. 280).

Appellant filed a Motion

to Stay Judgment Pending appeal on February 3, 1995

(Rec. 283).

Appellant filed a cost bond on appeal on February 23, 1995 (Rec.
299).

Appellant filed a supersedes bond on appeal on February 24,

1995 (Rec. 301). Appellant filed an Amended Notice of Appeal on
March 15, 1995 (Rec. 327-29).

STATEMENT OF FACTS

1.

Appellant in this matter was Plaintiff below.

2.

A Decree of Divorce was entered in the above-entitled

matter on or about December 31, 1990

(Rec. 84-88), pursuant to a

stipulation which occurred prior to October
accepted by the court on October 3, 1989

1, 1990 and was

(Rec. 68). At the time

the parties entered into the stipulation for the divorce, Appellee
was unemployed

(Rec. 10).

At the time of the stipulation,

Appellant believed that Appellee would not be able to work because
of poor health

(Tr. 72-73).

Subsequent to the signing of the

stipulation, but prior to the entry of the Decree, Appellee began
working as a cashier for O.P. Skaggs in Preston, Idaho

(Rec. 178-

79).
3.

The Decree required Appellant to pay Appellee $300.00

per month as and for permanent alimony, commencing October 20,
1990 and continuing on the 20th of each month thereafter
85).

(Rec.

The sum of $300.00 per month was agreed to by the parties

6

based upon Appellant's income at that time
time

of

the

Decree, Appellant

had

(Rec. 78).

monthly

gross

$3,776.24, and monthly net income of $2,513.81
Appellant had monthly expenses of $2,513.81
time, Appellant

owed

$19,711.93

on

$23,935.41 on his second mortgage

income

first

of

(Rec. 39-40).

(Rec. 42).

his

At the

At that

mortgage, and

(Rec. 40). At that same time,

Appellant owed $11,593.11 in unsecured credit card debt exclusive
of the obligation on his car
$15,862.95 on his car

Appellant owed

(Rec. 41). Appellant was ordered to assume

all debt of the parties
4.

(Rec. 40-41).

(Rec. 87-88).

The Decree awarded Appellee a house and property in

Lewiston, Utah

(Rec. 80). This property was awarded to Appellee

free of any encumbrance, in that Appellant was ordered to pay the
existing second mortgage which had been placed on the parties'
home in Salt Lake

(Rec. 80).

Approximately $15,000.00 of the

funds from the second mortgage had been used to purchase the
Lewiston property

(Rec. 44; Tr. 56) 2 . Appellee was awarded two

vehicles, household items, some tools, and one-half of Appellant's
retirement and profit sharing plan
not required to assume any debt
5.

(Rec. 81-82).

Appellee was

(Rec. 87-88).

On October 5, 1993, Appellant

filed a Petition for

Modification of the Decree to eliminate or reduce alimony to
Appellee

based

circumstances

on
(Rec.

a

substantial
110-15).

and

material

Appellant

2

also

change
alleged

of
that

Citations to the Transcript of the October 5, 1994 Modification hearing are
cited as "Tr." See supra note 1 and accompanying text.

7

Appellee had failed to turn over many items of property awarded to
Appellant in the Decree

(Rec. 115). Appellant's income had been

reduced to $2,500.00 and his monthly expenses had increased to
$3,411.51 (Rec. 119).
6.

A hearing on Appellant's Motion

Divorce Decree

based

upon

a

change

of

for Modification of
circumstances

of the

parties' respective financial conditions and earnings, was held on
October 5, 1994 before Judge Kenneth Rigtrip
7.

(Rec. 180-81).

Appellant presented evidence of a decline in his wages.

Appellant testified that he and his current wife drive as a team
for Pride Transportation, Inc.

(Tr. 46)

As a team driver, each

driver is paid nine and one-half cents per mile while driving and
four and one-half cents per mile for per diem, for a total of
fourteen cents per mile driven

(Tr. 46; 60). Appellant submitted

evidence

(exhibits 29 and 30) that based on his year-to-date

earnings

at

approximately

the

time

$2,500.00

of

the

hearing,

per

month

(Tr.

he

has

64-65).

income

of

Appellant

testified to an increase in his monthly expenses by presenting
summaries of Appellant's actual monthly expenses and evidence of
debts of Appellant incurred both prior to and subsequent to the
parties' divorce

(Tr. 50-66).

Appellant presented evidence that

his monthly debt load had increased by showing a total of credit
card obligations in the sum of $21,473.85

(Tr. 66; Rec. 152).

Appellant presented evidence that the amount due on the credit
line (the second mortgage) was currently $25,629.97

(Tr. 56).

Plaintiff's exhibit 29 evidenced that Appellant's monthly expenses

8

total $2,401.10

(Tr. 64-65).

Plaintiff's exhibit 30 evidenced

that Appellant and his current spouse's monthly expenses total
$4,453.99
8.

(Tr. 65).
Appellant testified that he left the employ of USPCI

because the company was beginning to terminate employees as part
of a reduction of force
employee benefits

(Tr. 78), that USPCI had cut or reduced

(Tr. 47; 77), that the risks

hazardous waste were great

of

driving

(Tr. 47-48), and that he had the

opportunity for other employment which would provide benefits
(Tr. 77-78).
9.

Appellee submitted a financial declaration on May 25,

1994, declaring her monthly expenses to be $921.80
150).

(Rec. 146-

Appellee testified that her monthly expenses total $929.80

(Tr. 29). Appellee testified that she earns $5.50 per hour at her
current employment and works approximately
(Tr. 32; 33-34).

35 hours per week

Appellee testified that she has had her current

employment since November, 1990

(Tr. 35). The trial court found

that Appellee's monthly income is $865.00

(Tr. 143).

Appellee

testified that her two adult sons live with her in her home

(Tr.

9-10; 38), that she pays $100.00 per month as one-third of the
home mortgage payment
of the

utilities

and

(Tr. 9), and that she pays only one-third
other

household

expenses

(Tr.

Appellee testified that her only debt is to her dentist

9;15).

(Tr. 37;

Rec. 147). Appellee testified that both her adult sons who live
with her have jobs and bring home income

(Tr. 38).

Appellee's

younger son earns approximately $700.00 to $800.00 per month

9

(Tr.

43)

Appellee

testified

that

the

purchased jointly with her elder son

property

she

lives

in is

(Tr. 8). She also testified

that the Lewiston, Utah property she received in her divorce from
Appellant is unencumbered and she transferred title to one or both
of her sons

(Tr. 26). Appellee testified that she was not able

to pay her attorney fees of $850.00 incurred in this matter

(Tr.

34).
10.

Appellee testified that she pays $100.00 per month for

her mortgage

(Tr. 121-22),

$18.36 per month for property taxes

(Tr. 122-23), $7.50 per month for real property insurance

(Tr.

123), $150.00 per month for food and household supplies

(Tr.

124), $34.66 per month for utilities
for laundry
$34.00

per

entertainment

(Tr. 124),
month

(Tr. 124), $10.00 per month

$25.00 per month dental

insurance

(Tr.

(Tr. 124-25),

125), $50.00

per

(Tr. 125), $40.00 per month incidentals

and $50.00 per month income tax

(Tr. 125).

month

(Tr. 125),

Appellee testified

that based on these figures, her actual monthly expenses are
$545.52
11.

(Tr. 126).
At

the

close

of

testimony,

counsel

for

proffered that his attorney fees incurred were $850.00
40).

Appellee
(Tr. 139-

After counsel's proffer, the trial court asked Appellant's

counsel if he had questions for Appellee's counsel regarding fees
(Tr. 140).

Appellant's counsel stated that he would question

Appellee's counsel if he were on the stand, but that it was not
his burden to put Appellee's counsel on the stand

(Tr. 140).

Appellant's counsel stated that he did not believe

fees were

10

necessary or that Appellee was entitled to an award of fees
140).

(Tr.

Appellee's counsel did not submit evidence or testimony to

support his request for fees.
12.

The

court

voluntarily terminated

made

a

determination

that

Appellant

his prior employment with USPCI, which

provided Appellant with an annual income of $48,000.00. (Tr. 143).
The court then determined that Appellant's current income along
with the income of his present wife amounts to approximately
$75,000.00 gross per year

(Tr. 144-45), and that this amount

exceeds Appellant's salary at the time the Decree was entered.
The court found that Appellant's monthly expenses on the road are
reimbursed by his employer as a non-taxed expense allowance of
$375.00 per month
13.

(Tr. 145).

The court found that the parties had contemplated that

Appellee would have to seek employment at the time the prior
Decree was entered
14.

(Tr. 143).

Based upon the above evidentiary findings, the court

denied Appellant's Petition finding that no material change of
circumstances occurred
terminated
15.

and alimony would

(Tr. 145).
The court also entered judgment against Appellant for

Appellee's attorney fees of $850.00
16.

not be decreased or

(Tr. 145).

On October 28, 1994, Appellant made a Motion for New

Hearing pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 59 alleging
that the ruling was against the evidence and there had been an
error in law

(Rec. 187-88).

Included in Appellant's Motion was

11

an argument that Appellee failed to meet her burden of proof to
support an award of attorney fees

(Rec. 199-200), and that the

court's finding that Appellant and his current wife had annual
income

of

$75,000.00

was

clearly

erroneous

(Rec. 192-95).

Appellant submitted an affidavit from Robert Oberg which set forth
that truck drivers are governed by statutes of the United States
which allow drivers to drive a maximum number of hours between
time off duty, and a maximum number of hours during a week
202-03).

(Rec.

Appellant submitted an affidavit of Dan DeGrazio which

set forth that Appellant is paid only $.095 per mile along with
$.045 per mile in per diem for a total of $.14 per mile

(Rec.

204-06), and that the $200.00 per trip advance is to be used for
expenses related to Pride Transport's truck and is not for the
driver's personal expenses
17.

(Rec. 205).

Appellee responded to Appellant's Motion

(Rec. 207-08),

and both parties submitted for decision without requesting oral
argument
18.
to

hear

(Rec. 211-12; 218-19; 221-22).
Oral argument was set by the court for January 30, 1995
Appellant's

Motion

for

Rehearing

(Rec.

223-24).

Subsequent to the setting of oral argument, Appellant filed a Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 60(b)(2) Motion for New Hearing
based on newly discovered evidence that Appellee participated in a
business with her son

(Rec. 225-26).

Because oral argument was

already set by the court, Appellant requested that both Motions be
heard at the same time

(Rec. 234-36).

12

19.

At oral argument, the trial court denied Appellant's

Motion for a Rehearing but, without prior notice to Appellant that
evidence would be taken, the court took testimony from Appellee's
(2Tr. 12-18)3.

counsel regarding attorney fees

The court allowed

Appellee's counsel to testify to both the original modification
hearing and the oral argument

(2Tr. 13).

Appellee's counsel

offered no exhibits to show the time he expended on the matter,
that the time spent was reasonable, nor that the fee charged was
reasonable to the standards in the community

(2Tr. 13; 15), but

did testify that he had spent the time on both matters and that
his rate is $175.00 per hour
20.

(2Tr. 14).

Without further evidence, the court modified his prior

finding and found that Appellant's income, along with that of his
present wife is at least between $68,000.00 and $75,000.00

(Rec.

275; 309). The court found that Appellant's present wife was not
hired as a team driver because of her experience but because she
is married to Appellant

(Rec. 275-76; 309). The court then found

that more than half of the income of the couple can be attributed
to Appellant
21.

(Rec. 276; 309).

The court

found that Appellant's

counsel

had

opportunity to "grill" Appellee's counsel regarding fees
277).

ample
(Rec.

The court determined that $300.00 per month for alimony,

given that it is tax deductible, is conservative and there was no
basis

for

modification

(Rec.

3

276-77).

The

court

denied

Citations to the Transcript of the January 30, 1995 Oral Argument are cited
as "2Tr." See supra note 1 and accompanying text.

13

Appellant's Rule 60(b) motion and denied Appellant's Motion for
New Hearing

(Rec. 277; 311).

The court then awarded additional

attorney fees to Appellee in the amount of $350.00 for time spent
defending Appellant's Motion for Rehearing

(Rec. 277; 311).

DETERMINATIVE LAW
1.

It is incumbent on the party requesting attorney fees to

demonstrate the necessity of the number of hours dedicated to the
matter, the reasonableness of the rate charged, the complexity of
the case and the result accomplished, and the rates commonly
charged

for

divorce

Newmeyer, 745 P.2d

actions
1276, 1279

in the

community.

(Utah 1987).

Newmeyer

v.

(citing Beals v.

Baals, 682 P.2d 862, 864 (Utah 1984); Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380,
1384-85 (Utah 1980)); accord Delatore v. Delatore, 680 P.2d 27, 28
(Utah 1984).
2.

A factual finding is clearly erroneous if a reviewing

court will be firmly convinced that a mistake has been made.
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987).
3.

In order to support an award of alimony, the court must

examine the receiving spouse's financial conditions and need, the
receiving spouse's ability to earn adequate income and contribute
to her own needs, and the providing spouse's ability to provide
support.
4.

Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985).
For a modification of a decree, there must be a showing

of a substantial change of circumstances occurring since the entry
of the decree which was not contemplated in the decree itself.
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Moore v. Moore, 872 P.2d 1054, 1055 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Dnrfee
v. Purfee, 796 P.2d 713, 716 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in awarding Appellee attorney fees in
the sum of $850.00 for the modification hearing because Appellee
failed to carry her burden to show that the rate charged was
reasonable and that the hours spent were necessary.

Appellee's

failure to put on any evidence or testimony as to the necessity or
reasonableness of the fees requires that the award of fees be
stricken. The burden to prove the reasonableness and necessity of
fees is on the party seeking the fees.

Appellant does not have

the burden to show that the fees requested are unreasonable if the
party seeking fees has not shown that the fees are reasonable.
The trial court erred by awarding fees to Appellee at oral
argument on Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial.

Appellant set forth

that the court had erred by awarding fees at the modification
hearing because Appellee had failed to carry her burden of proof.
At oral argument, the trial court apparently agreed with Appellant
because the court swore in Appellee's counsel and had him testify
as to both the modification hearing and oral argument.
court then awarded fees to Appellee.

The trial

The award was in error

because Appellant's motion was correct and the award of fees
against Appellant was an abuse of discretion.

Appellee again

failed to carry her burden to support an award of fees at oral
argument.

Counsel

testified

as

15

to

the

time

he

spent, but

submitted

no

evidence

to

support

his

testified that he keeps written records.

testimony

although

he

Appellee did not testify

as to her ability to pay fees.
The finding that Appellant and his current wife have annual
income of $75,000.00 is clearly erroneous.

Evidence submitted by

Appellant establishesf and it is undisputed, that Appellant is
paid

$.14

per mile driven which

includes

a $.045 per diem.

Appellant and his current wife drive as a team, and each is paid
$.14 per mile when driving.

Appellant's income is the amount of

miles he drives multiplied by $.14.

The trial court's conclusion

that Appellant and his current spouse earn $75,000.00 per year is
clearly erroneous

in that Appellant

and his spouse would

be

required to drive more than 60 miles per hour, 24 hours per day, 7
days per week, 52 weeks per year to earn $75,000.00.
The trial court erred by adding the expense reimbursement
column to Appellant's gross income but failing to deduct the
advances.

At the beginning of each trip, Appellant is advanced

$200.00 to cover expenses involving the truck.

At the end of the

trip, Appellant submits receipts for funds actually expended.
advance is then deducted from his check.

The

The trial court erred by

concluding that the $200.00 was an advance to cover Appellant's
personal expenses while on the road.
The trial court erred when it modified its previous findings
at oral argument without granting Appellant's motion
trial.

for new

The trial court modified its previous findings, but made

no evidentiary findings to support the modification.
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The court

again erred in its new findings that Appellant and his current
wife have income of between $68,000.00 and $75,000.00 per year.
The

trial

court

erred

by

finding

that

the

parties

contemplated that Appellee would seek employment at the time of
the

divorce.

The

Decree

does

not

state

that

the

contemplated that Appellee would increase her earnings.

parties

There was

no evidence presented to the trial court that the parties actually
contemplated that she would seek further employment, and Appellant
testified that it was his understanding at that time that Appellee
would not be able to work because of health problems.

The

increase is not contemplated within the Decree and it was error
for the court to so find.
The increase in Appellee's income from almost nothing to
$865.00 per month constitutes a material change of circumstances
and it was error for the court to fail to make an analysis of the
factors requiring alimony.

The trial court's failure to consider

the substantial and material change of circumstances was clearly
erroneous and requires reversal.
The trial court failed to consider the factors supporting an
award of alimony of determining the need of the receiving spouse,
the ability of the paying spouse to pay, and the ability of the
receiving spouse to provide for her own needs.

The trial court

erred by not finding that Appellant no longer has the ability to
pay alimony, that Appellee no longer has the need for alimony, and
Appellee is able to support herself.

Based on those factors, it

was error for the trial court to fail to modify the Decree.
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Finally, it was

error

for

the

trial

court

to

consider

Appellant's spouse's income in the determination of Appellant's
ability to

pay.

Appellant's

spouse

does

obligation to pay alimony to the Appellee.

not

have

a

legal

The trial court took

into account the income of Appellant's wifef but failed to take
into consideration her expenses.

Appellant and his wife do not

have the ability to pay alimony to Appellee.

The trial court

erred by considering the income but not the total expenses.

ARGUMENT
I.
THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES WITHOUT TESTIMONY OR EVIDENCE IS
CLEARLY CONTRARY TO ESTABLISHED UTAH LAN
A. Appellee failed to present any evidence to support an award
of attorney fees
This Court should strike the trial court's award of attorney
fees to Appellee because the granting of attorney fees absent any
evidence

or

testimony

is

clearly

against

established

Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1987).

law.

It is incumbent

on the party requesting attorney fees to demonstrate the necessity
of the number of hours dedicated to the matter, the reasonableness
of the rate charged, the complexity of the case and the result
accomplished, and the rates commonly charged for divorce actions
in the community. Id. at 1279 (citing Beals v. Beals, 682 P.2d at
864; Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380, 1384-85 (Utah 1980)); accord
Delatore v. Delatore, 680 P.2d 27, 28 (Utah 1984).
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Factors to be

considered for the reasonableness of fees include the time and
labor required, the novelty of the issue, the skill required, the
likelihood that the lawyer will not be able to accept other
employment, the fee customarily

charged

in the locality, the

amount involved, the result obtained, the time limitation imposed
by

the

client,

the

nature

and

length

of

the

relationship, and the experience of the lawyer.
Administration,

Rule

1.5(a)(l)-(8).

professional

Code of Judicial

Appellee

presented

no

evidence or testimony to support an award of attorney fees and as
such, the award should be stricken.
This Court can reverse an award of attorney fees and costs
when either financial need or reasonableness has not been shown.
Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421, 426 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Miinns
v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116, 122 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

Appellee failed

to show the reasonableness of the awarded fees.

At the close of

testimony, Appellee's

counsel proffered

$850.00 and that was his request.

that his fees totaled

Appellee presented no evidence

of the reasonableness of his rate, the necessity of the number of
hours, or in fact even the actual number of hours expended, nor
the rates commonly charged in the community.
did not testify.
of fees.

Appellee's counsel

There was no offer of any proof as to the award

In Newmeyer, the Utah Supreme Court held that unless the

party seeking attorney fees carries her burden to establish the
proper evidentiary basis for the award, it is clear error to award
fees.

Id. at 1280.

Additionally, the Utah Supreme Court in

Delatore, 680 P.2d at 28-29, set forth that an award of fees
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without evidence or testimony would be stricken.

Appellee failed

to establish that the fees were reasonable in light of the time
spent and the necessity thereof.

Appellee did not present any

testimony or evidence as to the necessity of the fees or the
reasonableness

thereof.

See

Newmeyer,

745

P. 2d

at

1279.

Thereforef because Appellee failed to carry her burden to support
an award of fees, the award of attorney fees to Appellee was
clearly an abuse of discretion and should be stricken.
Appellant does not have the burden to show that Appellee's
requested fees are unreasonable and the trial court's imposition
of that burden is clearly error.
fees.

The

questions.

court

asked

Appellee's counsel proffered his

Appellant's

counsel

if

he

had

any

Appellant's counsel stated that if Appellee's counsel

were on the stand, he would cross examine him.
did not take the stand.

Appellee's counsel

Appellee has set forth that Appellant's

failure to show that the fees were unreasonable by not calling
Appellee's counsel to the stand carries Appellee's burden.

The

Utah Supreme Court set forth that the party opposing fees does not
have the burden at trial to challenge the award when no evidence
was

presented

on

the

subject.

Delatore ,

680

P. 2d

at

29.

Appellant did not have the burden to show that the requested fees
were unreasonable because Appellee did not present any evidence
that the fees were reasonable.

The trial court's imposition of

the burden onto Appellant was clearly error and cannot be used to
support the award of fees.
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B. There is no factual basis to support an award of additional
attorney fees and those fees are not reasonable
1. Appellant's Motion for New Hearing was legally and
factually correct
This Court should

reverse

the

award

of

additional

fees

because there was no factual basis upon which a fee award could be
made. At oral argument on Appellant's Motion for New Hearing, the
court awarded additional fees to Appellee of $350.00.
Motion for Rehearing was based, inter

alia,

Appellant's

on Appellee's failure

to carry her burden of proof for attorney fees at the modification
hearing.

Appellant

submitted

decision without oral argument.

his

Motion

for

Rehearing

for

Appellee submitted her opposition

to Appellant's Motion without oral argument.

The trial court

scheduled oral argument. At the hearing on Appellant's Motion for
Rehearing, the Court allowed Appellee's counsel to testify to the
reasonableness of his fees in an improper and futile attempt to
correct

any

error

in

the

previously

awarded

Appellant's counsel was given an opportunity

attorney

fees.

to cross-examine

Appellee's counsel, but had no information provided upon which an
effective

cross-examination

could

be

conducted.

Appellee's

counsel offered no exhibits to support his testimony and testified
that he had brought no records to support his testimony.

The

court upheld its previous award of attorney fees then awarded an
additional $350.00 in fees for Appellee's defense of the matter.
The previously awarded fees were awarded against the proof offered
by Appellee.

Appellant complained of this lack of proof.
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The

trial court acknowledged

the error by

forcing evidence at a

scheduled oral argument to rectify its error.

The trial court

then awarded additional fees against Appellant for having brought
the error to the court's attention.

Because Appellant's Motion

was factually and legally accurate—Appellee failed to carry her
burden of proof in the first hearing—the award of additional fees
is improper.
2. Appellee failed to carry her burden as to reasonableness
and necessity of the awarded fees
This Court should reverse the trial court's award of attorney
fees to Appellee at oral argument on Appellant's Motion for New
Trial because Appellee again failed to carry her burden to show
the reasonableness or necessity of the award of fees.

A decision

to award fees must be based on evidence of financial need and
reasonableness.
1991).

Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73, 77 (Utah Ct. App.

Appellee's counsel again proffered that he had expended

time and Appellee incurred fees of $350.00.

Without notice to

Appellant, the trial court asked Appellee's counsel to take the
stand where he testified that he had spent time on the matter and
the same was reasonable.

Appellee's counsel did not bring any

time records, or other documents showing that he had actually
spent the time or that the same was reasonable.

Appellee's

counsel testified that he did not research any case law and that
he had only spent a short amount of time drafting his response
(2Tr. 16-17).

Appellee's counsel proffered, while on the stand,
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that his client would testify that she is unable to pay the fees
(2Tr. 15).

Prior to any oral argument, Appellee had requested

$350.00 for fees in her six paragraph Reply to Appellant's Motion
for New Hearing

(Rec. 207).

Appellee's counsel's testimony is

inadequate to establish that the fees requested are reasonable.
Appellee's counsel testified that the time he expended was in
consultation

with

his

client,

and

drafting

a

six

paragraph

pleading.

(2Tr. 14). There was no evidence that Appellee had a

financial

necessity

for

the

award

of

fees,

and

Appellee's

counsel's proffer on the stand is insufficient to support such an
award.

Appellee submitted no evidence to support the award as to

reasonableness or necessity, and therefore the award of additional
fees should be stricken.
II. THE FINDING THAT APPELLANT'S INCOME IS IN EXCESS OF
$75,000.00 PER YEAR IS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS
A. Appellant earns $.14 per mile driven for total income of
between $29,000.00 and $30,000,00 per year
The determination that Appellant has income of more than
$75,000.00 per year is clearly erroneous.
paycheck

stubs

Appellant's

and

Exhibit

a

summary

22,

which

of

his

was

Appellant submitted his
gross
created

yearly

income.

directly

from

Appellant's paycheck stubs, shows that Appellant has gross income
from February 11, 1994 through September 30, 1994 of $16,292.58.
On this same exhibit, April Dobson, Appellant's current wife,
shows a gross income for the period February 11, 1994 through
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September 30, 1994 of $17,833.70.

The court clearly erred by

concluding that Appellant and his current wife had a combined
yearly income in excess of $75,000.00.

The evidence is undisputed

that Appellant is paid $.14 per mile, including his per diem.
This amount is paid only to the person actually driving.

The

trial court set forth that an average week of driving would be
approximately 4700 miles and that Appellant and his current wife
drive only 50 weeks per year.

Multiplying 4700 miles by 50 weeks

by $.14 yields an annual income of $32,900.00.

But Appellant

testified that 4700 miles per week is too high and testified that
an average week would be less than 4500 miles, yielding annual
income of approximately $30,000.00.

This amount is consistent

with the evidence presented by Appellant that his monthly gross
income is approximately $2,500.00.

In order for Appellant and his

current wife to earn $75,000.00 per year, they would have to drive
more than 60 miles per hour, 24 hours per day, 7 days per week, 52
weeks per year.
B. The trial court erred by adding expense reimbursement and
advances to Appellant's total income
Appellant testified that Appellant's Exhibit 21, his paycheck
stub dated September 29, 1994, in the year-to-date column, showed
a total gross income of $13,565.10.
of $3,283.77 were deducted.
deducted.

From that gross income, taxes

Advances of

$5,693.60 were then

Appellant testified that prior to each trip, he is

given an advance of $200.00 by Pride Transport in order to cover
costs of repair or items required for the truck.
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Upon returning

back to Pride, Appellant is required to submit receipts for costs
expended on Pride's truck.
from Appellant's

pay,

Pride then deducts the $200.00 advance

less

the

amount

presented for costs actually spent.

supported

by

receipts

Appellant testified that the

company gives him $200.00, and when he returns from the trip if he
gives the company $150.00 in expense receipts, for funds spent on
the truck, $50.00 is deducted from his pay

(Tr. 94). Appellant

testified

in the year-to-date

that

the

expense

reimbursement

column included the reimbursement for repairs on the truck (other
reimbursement) and the per diem which, Appellant testified, is
$.045 per mile.

Appellant testified, that in order to read the

stub correctly, the expense reimbursement column should be added
in but the advances column should be subtracted

(Tr. 94).

In

Appellant's

presented

the

Motion

for

New

Hearing,

Appellant

Affidavit of Dan DeGrazio which set forth the correct reading of
the pay stub.

Within this affidavit, it was set forth that the

advances are only to be used by the driver to pay for repairs to
the truck

(Rec. 204-06).

This Affidavit also set forth that no

personal expenses of the driver are reimbursed by the company and
that each driver is only paid $.14 per mile including per diem.
Appellant testified that his gross earnings from Pride for the
period

February

11,

1994

through

September

30,

1994

were

$16,292.58, and that amount was listed on Appellant's Exhibit 22.
The court erred by adding the gross income to the expense
reimbursement, without deducting the advances, then adding the per
diem and other reimbursement again.
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By double counting what is

listed on one part of the pay stub and already included in the
year-to-date column, the court's conclusion was clearly erroneous.
The court also erroneously held that Appellant's road expenses,
such as

food

employer.
reimbursed.

and

incidentals, are

Appellant

testified

that

reimbursed
no

by Appellant's

road

expenses

were

Appellant testified that if he were required to

replace a tire or do other repairs on the truck owned by his
employer, those expenses are reimbursed and are accounted for in
the

other

reimbursement

category.

There

was

no

evidence

whatsoever that any road expenses such as food and incidentals are
reimbursed by Appellant's employer.

It was clearly erroneous for

the trial court to consider that personal expenses were reimbursed
by the company.
C. The court erred when it modified its findings
The trial court erred in modifying its previous findings at
oral argument and concluding that Appellant and his current wife
have annual income of between $68,000.00 and $75,000.00.

As set

forth above, based on a high average of miles driven, Appellant
and his wife have an annual income of approximately $60,000.00.
The trial

court, at

conclusion, based

oral

argument, made

on Appellant's

Motion

the

change

in his

for New Hearing, of

Appellant's salary, but made no findings as to the information on
which he based the change.

The court's modified findings that

Appellant and his wife have an annual income of between $68,000.00
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and $75,000.00 is clearly erroneous and does not have any factual
support, nor did the trial court make any further findings on
which the modified conclusion regarding Appellant's income could
be based.
D. This case should be remanded for a proper evidentiary finding
This Court should remand this matter to the trial court
because the finding that Appellant's income exceeds $75,000.00 per
year

is

clearly

insufficient to

erroneous,
justify the

and

as

judgment.

such,

the

A

factual

evidence

is

finding

is

clearly erroneous if a reviewing court will be firmly convinced
that a mistake has been made.
(Utah 1987).

State v. walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193

The erroneous factual finding, along with the errors

in law, require this matter be remanded.
III. THE COURT'S FINDING THAT THE PARTIES CONTEMPLATED THAT
APPELLEE WOULD SEEK EMPLOYMENT WAS CLEARLY AGAINST THE EVIDENCE
A. There is no provision within the Decree anticipating
Appellee's increase in income
The court erred by finding that the parties contemplated at
the time of divorce that Appellee would have to seek employment to
provide for herself.

The Findings of Pact and Conclusions of Law

upon which the original Decree of Divorce was based, did not state
that the parties contemplated that Appellee would seek employment.
"The fact that the parties may have anticipated an increase of
income in their own minds or in their discussions does not mean
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that the decree

itself contemplates

Durfee, 796 P.2d
testified

that

713, 716

at

the

the change."

Purfee v.

(Utah Ct. App. 1990).

Appellant

time

of

the

divorce,

Appellee

was

unemployed, and unable to work because of physical limitations
(Tr. 72-73).

In the October 5, 1994 hearing, Appellee presented

no evidence that the parties contemplated she would work.

In

fact, Appellee began working after the stipulation was entered
into, but prior to the entry of the decree of divorce in December,
1990 without informing Appellant or the court.
"In order
contemplated

in

for a material change in circumstances
a

divorce

decree

there

must

be

to be

evidence,

preferably in the form of a provision within the decree itself,
that the trial court anticipated the specific change."

Purfee,

796 P.2d at 716. The Decree awarded Appellee two cars and a piece
of property with a house in Lewiston, Utah free of debt.
did not take any of the parties' debt.
$300.00 per month alimony.

Appellee

Appellee was also awarded

There is no indication that the

parties based their agreement on the idea that Appellee would
work, and no provision

in the Decree which

stated

consideration was given to Appellee's future income.
provision

regarding

income

is

that

of

Appellant's

that

any

The sole
income.

Therefore, the Decree reflect that the parties contemplated that
Appellee would increase her earnings.
The court's finding that the parties contemplated Appellee
would work is clearly erroneous, especially in light of the fact
that no such provision exists in the Decree.
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The trial court

based his conclusion that Appellee would have to seek work on his
memory of
stipulation

the original

case

and

that

it was

based

upon a

(Tr. 141). The court then stated that "it was clear

at that time and indisputable and was within the contemplation of
the parties that Ms. Larson was going to have to go back to work"
(Tr. 143). However, there was no such provision in the Decree and
no finding of fact that such employment would occur.

Based on the

silence of the Decree, it must be concluded that such employment
was not contemplated within the Decree and therefore is a material
change of circumstances not contemplated within the Decree.

See

Dnrfee, 796 P.2d at 716.
B

Appellee's substantial increase in income is a material
change of circumstances
Appellee's increase in income from almost nothing at the time

of the divorce to $865.00 per month, almost $300.00 per month more
than

her

stated

needs,

constitutes

a

material

circumstances sufficient to modify the Decree.

change

of

In Purfee, the

Utah Court of Appeals held that if the decree at issue does not
have a provision expressly anticipating an increase in a party's
income, and no evidence is presented to the trial court that such
an increase was actually anticipated, the increase is not a
material change of circumstances
decree.

796 P.2d at 716.

contemplated

in the original

Because the increase in Appellee's

income is not contemplated in the original decree, the court must
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examine the relevant factors in the award of alimony to determine
whether alimony is warranted.
The trial court

failed

to make

a

determination

of

the

propriety of alimony in this case because it erroneously concluded
that Appellee's increase in income was contemplated at the time of
the Decree.

The trial court erroneously failed to consider the

material increase of Appellee's income within the factors of need
and

ability

based

on

the

court's

erroneous

conclusion

that

Appellee's increased income was contemplated at the time of the
Decree.

Therefore, this Court should remand this matter to the

trial court with instructions to consider that Appellee's increase
in

her

income

is

a

material

change

contemplated at the time of the Decree.

of

circumstances

not

The trial court should

then be instructed to consider the factors required to support an
award of alimony to determine whether Appellant is entitled to a
modification.

30

IV. THE COURT FAILED TO APPLY THE PROPER LEGAL TEST TO DETERMINE
WHETHER APPELLEE SHOULD CONTINUE TO RECEIVE ALIMONY
A. The trial court failed to consider the proper factors used to
determine alimony
1. Modification of alimony must consider the need of the
receiving spouse and the ability of the paying spouse to
pay
The trial court's determination that a substantial change in
circumstances

to warrant

a

modification

of

alimony

had

occurred was clearly erroneous based upon existing law.

not

In order

to modify an award of alimony, the moving party must show a
substantial change in circumstances, not contemplated at the time
of divorce.
1994).

Moore v. Mooref 872 P.2d 1054, 1055 (Utah Ct. App.

In order to support an award of alimony, the court must

examine the receiving spouse's financial conditions and need, the
receiving spouse's ability to earn adequate income and contribute
to her own needs, and the providing spouse's ability to provide
support.

Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985).

These

factors should also be examined in order to obtain a modification
of a divorce decree, when a substantial change of circumstances
has occurred. Moore, 872 P.2d at 1055.
2. Appellant no longer has the ability to pay alimony
Appellant does not have the ability to pay alimony because
his

income

increased.
substantially

is

substantially

Appellant
reduced

reduced,

presented
from

the
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and

evidence
time

his
that

the

expenses

have

his

income is

parties

divorced.

Appellant's evidence

showed

that

he

has

debt

which

requires

monthly service and that a portion of the debt is marital debt
from his marriage to Appellee, including the mortgage on the
property Appellee was awarded unencumbered.

Appellant presented

evidence that he has more than $21,000.00 in credit card debt
which requires monthly service.
Evidence of voluntarily incurred debt can be grounds for
modification of alimony if "they were incurred in a good faith
attempt to meet alimony obligations
standard of living."
(Utah 1977).

or to maintain a decent

Auerbach v. Auerbach, 571 P.2d 1349, 1350

Appellant presented evidence that at the time of the

Decree, Appellant was required to pay more than $11,000.00 in
credit card

debt

from

mortgages on his home.

the

parties' marriage

along

with

two

Since the divorce, Appellant has increased

his debt load in an almost equal proportion to the amount he is
required to pay in alimony.
is further

in

debt

on

Appellant presented evidence that he

the

second

mortgage

by

approximately

$1,500.00 and on credit card debt by approximately $10,000.00.
During the time from the Decree until the modification hearing,
Appellant has paid Appellee more than $18,000.00 in alimony.

The

evidence of the increased debt is consistent with the amount
Appellant is required to pay Appellee and should be considered as
to his ability to continue to pay.

Appellant's Exhibit 29 showed

that after monthly expenses, but prior to deducting the $300.00
alimony to Appellee, Appellant has a negative cash flow of more
than

$300.00.

The

trial

court
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erred

by

not

finding

that

Appellant's debt increase is consistent with Appellant's negative
cash flow.
Appellant presented evidence that his expenses on the road
have increased since the time of the decree.

Appellant stated

that his monthly road expenses are approximately $475.00.

This

amount covers food and other incidentals while traveling on the
road.

The trial court questioned Appellant about expenses and

suggested that Appellant take a cooler with apples, oranges, and
bologna

(Tr. 106). Appellant testified that the cooler would not

be practicable because the ice would melt in approximately four
hours, and that federal regulations require the driver to stop
approximately every five hours and take a break

(Tr. 106-08).

The trial court rejected the consideration of the expenses on the
road and erroneously concluded that Appellant should take a cooler
on his truck, and "start stopping at McDonald's and Wendy's and
fixing

your

own

snacks"

(Tr.

145).

The

trial

court's

determination that Appellant's road expenses had not increased or
they were avoidable is clearly erroneous.

The trial court erred

by not finding that Appellant's expenses had increased since the
time of the Decree.
The trial court

erred

by

not

concluding

that

based

on

Appellant's increase in debt, consistent with his negative cash
flow caused by paying alimony, his increase in expenses, and his
decrease in income, Appellant no longer has the ability to pay
alimony.
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3. Appellee no longer has the need for alimony
The trial court erred by not concluding that Appellee no
longer has the need for alimony.

The purpose of alimony is to

enable the receiving spouse to maintain a standard

of living

enjoyed during the marriage and to prevent her from becoming a
public charge.
1991).

Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73, 76 (Utah Ct. App.

Appellant's evidence and Appellee's testimony showed that

Appellee's monthly

expenses

are

reduced

substantially

because

Appellee pays only one third of the mortgage payment, only one
third of the household utilities, and only one third of the
household expenses, based on Appellee's two adult sons living with
her and paying their fair share of expenses.

Evidence also showed

that Appellee has no debt except for a small mortgage on her
primary residence.

Appellee has land in Lewiston, Utah worth

$15,000.00 which, by her choice, is unproductive.
monthly income is $865.00.

Appellee's

Appellee testified that she makes

$5.50 per hour and if she were to work 40 hours per week, she
would make $950.00 per month.

Appellee then testified that her

total actual monthly expenses, including
$545.52

food and taxes, are

Appellee has actual excess income of more than $300.00

per month, and then receives an additional $300.00 per month from
Appellant. The trial court erred by not determining that Appellee
no longer has a need for alimony.
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B. The trial court erred by considering Appellant's current
wife's income as a factor regarding Appellant's ability to
pay
1. Appellant's current wife's income cannot be considered
for Appellant's ability to pay
The trial court

erred

in

considering

Appellant's

wife's

income in determining whether Appellant has had a change
circumstances which

would

warrant

a modification

of

in

alimony.

Appellee presented no evidence of case law which supported the
proposition that the Appellant's spouse's income can be used to
determine Appellant's ability to provide support.

Appellant's

current spouse has her own circumstances and obligations with
which she must deal, and has no legal obligation to support
Appellee.

The determination to include both Appellant's and his

current spouse's income for purposes of alimony to Appellee was
clearly against the law and should be remanded for the proper
application of the legal test.
2. Appellant and his wife do not have the ability to pay
alimony
Even if Appellant's spouse's income were properly considered,
Appellant presented sufficient evidence to show that the two of
them together had a reduction from Appellant's earlier income and
no longer had the ability to pay the alimony.

Appellant's Exhibit

30 listed the combined income of Appellant and his current spouse,
and the total amount of their combined obligations.

Appellant and

his spouse still had a monthly negative cash flow of $135.31.

The

only relevance of Appellant's spouse's income for the modification
was to show her contribution to Appellant's household expenses.
The trial court's determination that Appellant had the ability to
pay, even when his spouse's income was considered was clearly
erroneous.

CONCLUSION
The trial court clearly erred in awarding attorney fees to
Appellee when she failed to carry her burden of proof as to the
reasonableness and necessity thereof.

The trial court committed

further error by awarding additional fees to Appellee at oral
argument when the trial court apparently agreed with Appellant
that Appellee failed to carry her burden of proof.
The trial court's finding that Appellant and his current
spouse have annual income in excess of $75,000.00
erroneous and not supported by the evidence.
per mile driven and no more.

is clearly

Appellant earns $.14

Appellant is not reimbursed by his

company for his personal expenses on the road.

It was error for

the trial court to conclude that those expenses are reimbursed.
The trial court's finding that it was contemplated at the
time of the Decree that Appellee would seek employment is not
supported by the evidence in that there is no such statement in
the Decree, and there was no evidence presented to the court to
make such a finding.
The trial court's failure to analyze the factors involved in
an award of alimony was clearly erroneous.
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The trial court erred

by not finding that Appellant no longer has the ability to pay,
that Appellee no longer has need for alimony, and that Appellee
can now support herself.

The trial court

considering Appellant's current wife's
Appellant's ability to pay.

further

erred

by

income when determining

The trial court failed to consider

the added expenses of the current spouse if he considered the
added income.

The trial court's failure to correctly consider

income and expenses was erroneous.
Based on the foregoing, this Court should reverse the trial
court, strike the awards of attorney fees, and remand to the trial
court for correct evidentiary findings.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED

this ^ V ^ d a y of September, 1995.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the <%<$ ciay of September, 1995, two
true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF FOR THE APPELLANT
were hand-delivered to :
M. Byron Fisher, Esq.
FABIAN & CLENDENIN
215 South State #1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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ADDENDUM
Exhibit "1" Trial court's ruling on Modification October 5, 1994

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH
^r*

^s

^r*

^*

^*

VARNELL J . DOBSON

Transcript of:

Plaintiff,

Modification
Hearing

vs.

DOROTHY LYNENE DOBSON
Defendant,

The

above-entitled

Case No. 894904084

cause

of

action

came on

regularly for hearing before the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup,
a Judge of the Third Judicial District Court of the State
of Utah, at Salt Lake County, Utah, on Wednesday, October 5,
1994, at 10:00 a.m.

APPEARANCES

For the Plaintiff:

GLEN M. RICHMAN
Attorney at Law
60 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, Utah

For the Defendant:

BYRON M. FISHER
FABIAN & CLENDENIN
215 South State
Salt Lake City, Utah

one-fourth hours in preparation and presentation,
although it has taken more than that time today than it
was anticipated.

My proffer is that my usual and

regular, normal hourly billing rate, and as due for my
client, is $850 in attorney's fees.
THE COURT:

Do you have any questions to ask of

Mr. Fisher?
MR. RICHMAN:

He hasn't taken the stand. I

don't agree he ought to be awarded attorney's fees or
they are reasonable.
THE COURT: You want him to be sworn?
MR. FISHER:

I have made my proffer, Your

Honor.
THE COURT:

I am just asking you if you want to

question him, if you disagree with his proffer.
MR. RICHMAN:

If he were on the witness stand

and sworn, I would ask questions.

Since he is not, I am

not going to ask questions.
I don't have any quarrel with him having spent
that much time. His hourly rate is probably reasonable.
I don't think it is necessary or he is entitled to fees
under this condition.
THE COURT: One of the most significant factors
that guides the Court in what it must do in this case is
that this was a bargained-for-divorce.

It was agreed to,
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1

and once the parties agree to something it is difficult

2

for the Court to undo what the parties do.

3

that results in harsh results, inequities, unfairness.

4

Facial unfairness just looking at things, but this isn't

5

that case.

6

And sometimes

This case is one where the parties married on

7

April 14, 1961. They bargained for their divorce on

8

October 3, 1990.

9

remember Mr. Cayias and Mr. Fisher coming into my

I don't remember much about it. I

10

chambers and I remember that issues were discussed.

11

generally the deal was put together by Mr. Fisher and Mr.

12

Cayias, and there was exchange, I am sure, back and forth

13

between the parties, and give and take, and the ultimate

14

result of a tug back and forth and the final result was

15

achieved.

16

But

The Court can't rely on precedence on

17

unpublished opinions, but lower courts take their

18

instructions from the Appellate Court, and this is merely

19

instructional on what the Appellate Court thinks may be

20

fair.

21

but the case is Nichols vs. Nichols which there was an

22

order reversing in part and affirming in part, a May 26,

23

1989 decision signed by Judge Beck.

24

Judges Greenwood and Judge Croft.

25

I have only been appealed once in an alimony case,

He was joined by

The man was employed at Kennecott Copper.
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There were no findings so I simply relied on memory.

It

was the rejiggered Kennecott Copper when wages were much
lower.

As I recall, the man's wages were in the range of

18,000 a year.

The woman had two children.

at the age of majority.

One was just

The other was still in or out of

the home, and the other daughter was 16 or 17 years of
age.

She had a small modest home in Magna which she got.

I heard a half a day's testimony from a medical doctor
who testified for a whole half day with a litany, an
unending litany of maladies as to why she was not
employable.
was.

I cannot remember what the child support

It would have been the guideline amount.

I can't

remember the amount of alimony, but it is a threesentence order.

One sentence: "Based upon the evidence

in the record and the Court's findings, appellant is
hereby awarded alimony of $500 per month and child
support for Rebecca at the rate of $200 per month."

So

my order after a trial was less than those amounts.
So considering a 29-year marriage, at $300 a
month alimony, bargained for, with a tax return for 1990
demonstrating income of $49,761 for Mr. Dobson and on the
other hand for Ms. Larsen, the representations to the
Court then were zero.
The financial declaration in the file dated
March 26, 1990 showed $3776.24 income for Mr. Dobson.
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Showed nothing for her.

And the testimony the Court has

heard is that she went to work in November of 1990. The
decree was entered December 31, 1990, some two or three
months, almost three months after the stipulation was
entered between the parties.
It was clear at that time and undisputable and
was within the contemplation of the parties that Ms.
Larsen was going to have to go back to work.
going to get by on $300 per month.

She wasn't

She got a home in

Lewiston, Utah, that wasn't inhabited then and still
isn't inhabited, and she got a 1981 Cadillac.

I don't

recall that she got much else that was spendable or
useable at all.

It is obvious you couldn't get by on

$300 per month.

Currently she earns $5.50 per hour.

says she works 35 hours per week.

She

She works a little

more than that based upon a seven and a half months
history and the Court finds that she earns reasonably
$865 per month from her employment at O.P. Skaggs.
On the other hand, Mr. Dobson worked for USPCI
and during the years 1990 through termination of his
employment, he earned in the range of $48,000 to $55,000
year-in and year-out.

He voluntarily terminated that

employment, but did not, in the Court's mind, adversely
affect his position, although the earnings that are
attributable to him are somewhat less.
143

1

When you consider the combined earnings of he

2

and his wife, they are not that shockingly different. He

3

had gross earnings year-to-date of 9-30-94 having started

4

his employment on February 11, 1994 of $13,565.10. He

5

received expense advances of $5,693.60 and was reimbursed

6

expenses of $8,553.08, leaving a net for his pocket of

7

$2,859.48. Adding that to the $13,565.10, gives him

8

gross income year-to-date September 30, 1994, of

9

$16,424.58.

In addition to that amount on that paycheck,

10

he had mileage of 4,874 miles, at 4 cents a mile,

11

yielding $194.96. And if you figure 4500, that still

12

yields mileage per diem of $180. Applying that on a

13

weekly basis and converting that to a monthly figure,

14

means that he gets 800 to $840 per diem on a monthly

15

basis, which yields monthly earnings to him in the range

16

of $3,000 per month or $36,000 per year.

17

His wife, going through the same analysis, has

18

more earnings on hers and the difference is largely

19

because she gets the same per diem he does.

20

some expense reimbursements without the large offsetting

21

advance figure.

22

advances of 200 but received reimbursed expenses of

23

$4,959.60, which yielded to her year-to-date income of

24

$17,890.70, plus a monthly per diem of 800, $840 which

25

would yield combined income of the two of them of $6,250

She gets

On her year-to-date figure, she only had
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per month.

On an annualized basis, $75,000 per year.

For them to suggest she ought to make choices,
going down her expenses, arguing with every $5 and $10
and think the Court is not serious about taking a cooler
onto your truck and start stopping at McDonald's and
Wendy's and fixing your own snacks if you are going into
debt, you have to make choices.

And it is offensive to

the Court that you think those choices ought to be
whittled out of her $5 or $10 items for the sake of
having a combined monthly, unreimbursed, non-taxed
expense allowance of 360, $375 per month.
There are not substantial and material changes
of circumstances to justify a modification.
shall remain at $300 per month.

The alimony

The plaintiff is awarded

judgment for alimony arrearages of $2600, plus the
general rate of interest which is allowable by law from
the date those payments were due, plus $850 attorney's
fees.
Will you prepare appropriate Findings,
Conclusions and Decree?
MR. FISHER:

I will.

THE COURT: With respect to the issue on the
$2500, that is covered.

You have got a QDR0.

You have

got an award of it in the decree and if per chance those
funds were taken and wrongfully disbursed by the trustee,
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ADDENDUM

Exhibit "2" Attorney fees proffer
Modification hearing October 5, 1994

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICTIN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH
^s

^p

^p.

^s

^n

VARNELL J. DOBSON
Transcript of:

Plaintiff,

Modification
Hearing

vs.
DOROTHY LYNENE DOBSON

Case No. 894904084

Defendant,
* # * * *

The

above-entitled

cause

of

action

came

on

regularly for hearing before the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup,
a Judge of the Third Judicial District Court of the State
of Utah, at Salt Lake County, Utah, on Wednesday, October 5,
1994, at 10:00 a.m.
APPEARANCES

For the Plaintiff:

GLEN M. RICHMAN
Attorney at Law
60 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, Utah

For the Defendant:

BYRON M. FISHER
FABIAN & CLENDENIN
215 South State
Salt Lake City, Utah

anyone else's living expenses, except the recipient's
when you are looking at her expenses.
a case of Willy vs. Willy.

And it also cites

It doesn't matter if they are

step children, adult children or grand children.
her expenses that we care about.

It is

Although it was

laborious to do so and it almost sounds picky, we went
through the financial declaration and cleared some of
those things up that have been falsely put before this
Court, or inaccurately put before this Court.
I would suggest that the Court ought to make an
order that would be effective in modifying the decree by
terminating alimony; effective as of the date we filed
this petition.

And I think to do otherwise merely puts

this man in a continuing posture where he cannot perform
and then is made out as a bad guy.

He is not a bad guy.

He sat on the witness stand and told the Court the truth
about his circumstances and he is a very straightforward
person, hard worker.

It is preposterous to think that he

is intentionally earning less money with very long and
hard hours to avoid paying $300.
Your Honor.

I just can't buy that,

Thank you.

MR. FISHER:

I did not proffer any attorney's

fees and I think for the record I need to do that.
THE COURT: You may do so.
MR. FISHER:

Thank you.

I have spent six and
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one-fourth hours in preparation and presentation,
although it has taken more than that time today than it
was anticipated.

My proffer is that my usual and

regular, normal hourly billing rate, and as due for my
client, is $850 in attorney's fees.
THE COURT:

Do you have any questions to ask of

Mr. Fisher?
MR. RICHMAN:

He hasn't taken the stand.

I

don't agree he ought to be awarded attorney's fees or
they are reasonable.
THE COURT:

You want him to be sworn?

MR. FISHER:

I have made my proffer, Your

Honor.
THE COURT:

I am just asking you if you want to

question him, if you disagree with his proffer.
MR. RICHMAN:

If he were on the witness stand

and sworn, I would ask questions.

Since he is not, I am

not going to ask questions.
I don't have any quarrel with him having spent
that much time.

His hourly rate is probably reasonable.

I don't think it is necessary or he is entitled to fees
under this condition.
THE COURT:

One of the most significant factors

that guides the Court in what it must do in this case is
that this was a bargained-for-divorce.

It was agreed to,
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ADDENDUM
Exhibit "3" Transcript of Oral Argument, January 30, 1995

1

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR

2

SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
*

3

41 VARNELL J. DOBSON,
Plaintiff,

5

61

-vs-

7

DOROTHY LYNENE LARSON
(DOBSON),

8

1

*

*

S^2r
Case No. 894904084 DA
BENCH DECISION, 1-30-95

Defendant.

91
10

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 30th day

11
12

of January, 1995, at 10:00 o'clock a.m., this cause

13

came on for hearing before the HONORABLE KENNETH

14

RIGTRUP, District Court, without a jury in the Salt

15

Lake County Courthouse, salt Lake City, Utah.

16
17

A P P E A R A N C E S :

18

For the Plaintiff:

GLEN M. RICHMAN
Attorney at Law

For the Defendant:

BYRON FISHER
Attorney at Law

19
20
21
22
23
24
25

CAT by:

CARLTON S. WAY, CSR, RPR

1

P R O C E E D I N G S

2

THE COURT:

Let me just simply review

3

briefly some of the considerations I had in mind:

4

Reference was made in your pleadings, Mr* Richman, to

5

the fact that there were findings made at the initial

6

divorce.

7

stipulated settlement on the record.

8

there might have been discussion between Counsel and

9

clients and even in the presence of the Court about

That is incorrect because the parties
And although

10

Mrs. Dobson's health and her inability to work, there

11

were no findings made thereon.

12

This was a marriage of 29 years

13

duration.

14

about his income at the time of the divorce, I

15

pointed out, I think, in my oral decision that there

16

was a Financial Declaration indicating that he had

17

$45,000 plus income during 1990 which was the year

18

that the divorce took place.

19

And although were there were no findings

There was an exhibit offered by you

20

Indicating a copy -- that there was a copy of his tax

21

return showing that he had gross income in 1990 of

22

near $50,000.

23

Based upon her lack of employment and the

24

award of $300 per month, there clearly were not any

25

findings made about her health and inability to

1

work.

But it is obvious to anyone that it was

2

reasonably within the contemplation of the parties

3

that she'd have to go to work.

4

on $300 per month.

5

She couldn't get by

The Court may have misinterpreted the pay

6

stubs of Mr, Dobson and his current wife.

7

order specifically reports that there was combined

8

income of the two of over $75,000.

9

here.

10

And the

Mr, Dobson is not

By now he has W-2's for 1994 and any doubt

could be removed.

11

I've gone back and looked at the

12

underlying documents and I've reviewed your Affidavit

13

of Mr, -- what is it, Degarsio (phonetic) or

14

something?

15
16
17

MR. READING:

Degrasio (phonetic), I

believe, Your Honor.
THE COURT;

-- close to that, and it's

18

possible that I did misunderstand, but not very far*

19

The mileage reflected on the pay stubs I

20

had, both Mr. and Mrs. Dobson, reflected 4,874 miles

21

for one week of driving.

22

average week, assuming that they drive 50 years -- or

23

50 weeks of the 52 and taking nine and a half cents

24

per mile mileage plus four and a half percent -- four

25

and a half cents for their reimbursement allowance or

Assuming that's a fairly

1

14 cents per driver, you —

and doing those

2

calculations, you come up with $68,250 on an

3

annualized basis.

4

MR, READING:

For two people.

5

THE COURT:

6

There was a discrepancy between what was

For two people.

7

reported as expense to reimbursements and as

8

advances,

9

year, the Court really could not reconcile it;

And without seeing the w-2 for the full

10

though, my impression was that there was some

11

advantage gained to both the Dobsons in getting some

12

reimbursements for what they expended*

13

need the '94 W-2's to really size that up.

14

But 1 would

But at minimum, going through the

15

calculations that I did on my mileage, it's clear to

16

me that they have income of at least $68,000 per year

17

between the two of them,

18

They didn't hire Mrs* Dobson because she

19

was an experienced driver*

The marketability of the

20

team was principally because of Mr. Dobson*

21

the experienced driver that had driven for many

22

years, and he was the guy that knew the trucking

23

business.

24

chauffeur's license or a commercial license so that

25

she could drive an 18-wheeler and be part of the

He was

she took the test and she got a

1

team.

2

The statements •- the two check stubs

3

that you gave me demonstrated that the higher income

4

was on April Dobson's statement more than

5

Mr. Dobson's.

6

respective backgrounds and experience in terms of

7

driving.

That is not credible in view of their

8

So it is the Court's conclusion that it's

9

reasonably inferable from that that more than half of

10

the 68,000 is reasonably attributable to Mr. Dobson,

11

Given a 29-year marriage and given the

12

conservative estimate of alimony at $300 per month,

13

the $35,000 income at least that he had and the

14

income that she had at five dollars and fifty cents

15

per hour or roughly 825 -- or $830 per month income,

16

does not justify modification.

17

There's still a large disparity in

18

income.

The choice to leave the subsidiary at Union

19

Pacific was that of Mr. Dobson's, and his current

20

situation were the choices of Mr. Dobson*

21

that she had an interest in a broken-down property in

22

Smithfield, Utah, was a property division.

23

acquisition of modest housing in Preston, Idaho, is

24

within the reasonable contemplation of the parties.

25

And the fact that she's taken up camp with two sons

The fact

Her

1

is some reasonable indication to the Court that they

2

do that in their interest of -- self-interest of

3

survival•

4

And given all of those circumstances, the

5

Court's decision to not modify was sound and

6

sustainable on appeal,

7

I think I gave you ample opportunity to

8

grill Mr. Fisher to a fare-thee-well if you had

9

desired to do so.

And the starting of a business

10

after that hearing is done with wild expectation, I'm

11

sure, on the part of Mrs. Dobson and her son, but the

12

proof of the pudding is down the line in terms of

13

whether that's going to be productive.

14

she makes lot of money, then the Court's in a

15

position certainly at that point to modify.

16

I suspect if

$300 a month alimony, given the fact that

17

Uncle Sam and the state tax collector pay 30, 35

18

percent of that is still a very, very modest alimony

19

award under all the circumstances.

20
21

The motion for relief based upon newly
discovered evidence is denied.

22

The motion for a new trial is denied.

23

And an additional $350 is awarded to

24
25

Mr. Fisher for his rendering a defense herein.
MR. FISHER;

I will prepare that order,

Your Honor-

Thank you*
THE COURT:

If the 1994 W-2 reflects that

the $75,000 is in error, then I suppose I would
accept a late-filed exhibit and correct that one
finding.

But on an annualized basis, I suspect my

analysis of the 60,000 on an annual basis as a
roinimum threshold is still reasonably accurate.
MR. FISCHER;
THE COURT:

Thank you, sir.
We will be in recess.
(Hearing adjourned.)
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